Abstract -This paper presents a novel algorithm to spot a known video sequence within a live video stream. The algorithm is split into two branches, a branch to create a digital signature out of the video sequence in question, and another is to search for this sequence within a live video stream. The algorithm is categorized to consume low processing power and satisfy real-time requirements. Thus, this allows the algorithm to search for not only one video sequence, but more, and not only within one video stream but more, resulting in a many-to-many relationship. Both branches of the proposed algorithm are based on selecting key frames, processing these frames, and performing a number of comparisons that involve luminance image parameters.
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of searching for a video clip or sequence that is already known within a video stream is not that common. However, demands for such a task have increased with groups of people such as news agencies and marketing executives.
A reliable and automatic recognition of video sequences has applications in a number of areas. One application is the spotting of a specific commercial within TV channel streams. Marketing executives, for example, may wish to know when and how often a particular commercial has been broadcast. One possibility would be to store the entire commercial and continually compare broadcast signals against the stored video sequences in the library through a frame by frame comparison. This solution is not very practical since it would require a prohibitive amount of memory and processing power to implement. Besides, making this manual would drive searchers crazy when they try to locate a piece of a video with the absence of proper indexing information.
Thus, instead of a frame by frame comparison, selecting specific frames in both the video sequence and the live video stream then comparing these corresponding frames would reduce the processing power, number of comparisons, and the size of the video sequence in question to be stored in the library. However, the question that may be raised at this point is how to select these specific frames or key-frames. Selecting key-frames from a video stream that may contain all sorts of images is not an easy task. Furthermore, having this process to satisfy the real-time requirements is another story.
This paper proposes a method that works to spot a known video sequence, such as a specific commercial, within a live video stream. The method is split into two parts: one to generate a digital signature out of the video sequence in question, and another to search for this sequence within a live video stream such as that coming from a TV channel. The method satisfies the real-time requirements and consumes low processing power to the extent that more than one TV channel may be monitored for one or more of such video sequences.
In the following section, a brief study on few recent similar work have been presented. This is followed by a faire amount of detailed description on a cut detection algorithm, that exists in the market, on which the proposed method is based. Next in section four, the proposed method will be explained. Following that, in section five, the method is tested by running a number of experiments to show its robustness against change in frame rate and frame dropping. In section six, yet another few experiments was run. The results and their analysis were presented. Finally the paper concludes in section five.
II. RELATED WORK
Storing an entire video sequence and continually comparing the broadcast signals against a library of such stored sequences using frame by frame comparisons is not very practical since it would require a prohibitive amount of memory and processing power to implement. Ref [1] teaches the use of digital signatures to match video sequences. However, such signatures that, for example, represent the times between black shots or color changes are insufficient to permit fast and accurate matching of complex video sequences. Ref [2] describes a method of video recognition that involves creating digital signatures for all the frames in a sequence. This method involves an undue amount of processing power.
In the past, researchers have proposed several schemes to generate signatures out of a video sequence. Lin and Chang [3] and Yin and Hu [4] have proposed compressed domain schemes. To compute the signature, Lin and Chang [3] used the difference in DCT coefficients of frame-pairs. Yin and Yu [4] used DC-DCT coefficients as features to build a watermark. Such schemes are vulnerable towards data loss due to either possible network congestions in the input video stream, or due to the different lossy encoding techniques used on the original video versus the input video.
On uncompressed domain, some work has also been done to extract signatures out of features such as edges in the frame used by Dittman et al [5] and by Tzeng and Tsai [6] . In other work, He et al. [7] proposed an objectbased scheme that uses the background features to embed the watermark into foreground objects to establish a relation between background and the foreground of a video.
Although the purpose of generating Signatures out a video sequence may vary among researchers or applications, but they share the same concept of generating a Signature that is used to verify the existence of the original video sequence within another Video. In [8] for instance, the motivation behind generating a signature is to verify the authentication of the video against any benign operations, temporal tampering, or spatial tampering. However, Atey et al mentioned that their method could be used for advertisement monitoring as well. Just like ours, their proposed method works in uncompressed domain, which remains independent of the video format, to perform offline signature generation during the so-called 'offline-authentication' process, then do both offline and online verification. Their method implements three steps to generate the signature, These steps are named key-frame, shot, and video. However, the complexity of their method could rise to the order of O(width × height × N2), for a video clip of resolution width × height and of length N frames. They offer to reduce this for online verification when real-time is a requirement, such as in the advertisement monitoring scenario, by having the authentication and verification be done at the key-frame level only, that is implementing the only first step. Although the size of their proposed authenticating signature is normally supposed to equal a video frame size and it is independent of the length of the video in time, but in this case, the signature will be composed of a number of key frames along with their 'key-secret' frames. A key-secret frame is just an extrapolation to a number of non-key-frames between each pair of key-frames. Their key-frames selection is based on the differential energy differences that uses pixels luminance values. That is, after marking the first frame in a shot as a key frame, they compute the differential energy between the key frame and the subsequent frames. Once the differential energy level is found greater than a threshold value, the corresponding frame will then be marked as a key frame. The last frame will also be designated as a key frame. In the advertisement real-time monitoring scenario, their proposal becomes very similar to ours but with much less number of frames to consider per shot by our proposal, consequently faster to process. Our key-frame selection is based on SmartFrame cut detection algorithm, which selects one frame per shot; while in [8] , each shot may contain many key-frames. Besides, our proposed signature contains histograms of mainly those key-frames rather than computed frames.
Furthermore, Atey et al, [8] , believe that if the similarity value generated by comparing the computed query Signature with that of the candidate video is less than 100% then the candidate video is most likely tampered. However, no discussion were made on how to distinguish slightly tampered video from just way different video sequences, knowing that the rate of their similarity value drops is not linear, and sometimes sharp for random frame dropping.
The other issue that the work in [8] suffers is the lack of a matching process within a live input video. In other words, it is not clear how one would start marking the first key-frame in the input video. If, for instant, the process is to mark the beginning of every shot in the input video as the first key-frame and then includes it along with successive other key-frames and non-key frames for a length equals to the advertisement in question, in order to compute the compact signature, then comparing it with the query signature to decide whether there is a match or not, would be a very expensive and time consuming process, especially that the Signature generation process is intense.
The proposed method in this paper overcomes both issues, namely, it is fast in generating Signatures, and proposes an effective online real-time matching process.
Spotting a specific video sequence within another video stream problem overlaps the video fingerprinting problem in many ways. Their solutions work towards generating an appropriate Signature, or a fingerprint, out of the video sequence in question. In [9] for instant, Lee and Yoo have successfully presented a video fingerprinting method based on the centroid of gradient orientations. They also proved that their fingerprinting method achieves pairwise independence and robustness against common video processing steps. Their method to generate a fingerprint of the video sequence starts by resampling the input video at a fixed frame rate. Each resampled frame is converted to grayscale, then partitioned into blocks. Finally, the centroid of gradient orientations is calculated and normalized for each of these blocks. A fingerprint vector per frame is therefore composed of a number of values equals to the number of blocks within the frame, and the overall Fingerprint of the video sequence in question is composed of a sequence of such vectors.
While the goal of their video fingerprinting is to identify a given video sequence in a database (DB), it is very similar to our proposal with the difference that our proposed method is targeting real-time environment. Thus, both fingerprint or signature generation, as well as, searching or matching process must satisfy real-time requirements. Thus, our proposed method demands less computational cost in its signature generation and matching processes. As part of the processes they use simple histograms of luminance values to represent selected frames. However, if at any time in the future the centroid of gradient orientations calculation used by Lee and Yoo [9] satisfies real-time requirements, our proposed method could easily use it instead of the histogram part.
Another major difference between both proposals is in the approach of the signature generation process. Instead or resampling the video input at a fixed frame rate, the preprocssing phase of our method mainly divides the video sequence into shots before extracting significant key-frames, typically one for each shot.
Finally in the matching process, Lee and Yoo uses a single fingerprint search to pull out possible matching fingerprint sequences from the video database. They then calculate the distance between these fingerprint sequences and the one in question. If it is found below a certain threshold then the two video clips are declared similar. Unfortunately since their method lacks a reference point for frame resampling, the probability of False Rejection may be high especially when the query video represents an advertisement. In the next paragraph we further explain this.
Typically, advertisements are featured by high shots frequency to attract the viewers' attentions. That is, a 30 seconds ad may contain up to 7 to 12 shots, or scene cuts. Consider the scenario illustrated in Figure 1 . The middle layer represents the ad in question, while the upper and lower parts of the figure represent the resampled frames selected by Lee and Yoo on the query video and on a similar video in the database, respectively. The separating vertical lines represent cuts or the beginnings of the shots. In this scenario two of the selected frames appears to be very different between the query video and that in the database due to a small shift in the resampling process. Thus their corresponding fingerprints become different, and the distance between the fingerprint sequences becomes high which may result in a false rejection decision.
On the other hand, in the proposed method, the search process is based on shot cuts represented by key-frames. Thus, our method is claimed to be robust against both backward or forward shifting in frame sampling.
Finally, same overlapping may be found with contentbased copy detection problems. In [10] , Yeh and Cheng, for instant, partition each selected frame into four regions, each of which is described using the Markov stationary feature-Color as in [11] . However, they focused their work on accelerating the matching process through a two-level filtration approach. Yet, they still use fixed rate sampling to downsize the number of frames to work on, and they focus on searching through video databases (or published videos on the web) versus realtime video streaming.
III. PRE-PROCESSING: SCENE DETECTION
The goals of the proposed method is to alleviate the problems of accuracy and time efficiency, by providing a practical method of recognizing a predetermined video sequence that is reasonably accurate, yet at the same time requires an acceptable amount of processing power. The proposed method is a modified version of an earlier system that was issued in Ref. [12] , yet the focus in this paper is on commercials video sequences. This required few modifications mainly in the search engine which will be highlighted in this paper in section 5.
The core of the system is based on cut or scene detection algorithms to filter the video into key-frames. These key-frames which include the first frame in the shot after a cut, as well as other frames as it will be explained in section 4.
Detecting key-frames from a video sequence and letting these time-stamped key-frames to represent the sequence for the sake of spotting similar sequences within a video stream would reduce the number of comparisons to perform. However, cut detection is yet a difficult process when considering various types of camera breaks and operations. A typical simple camera cuts detection algorithm may result in detecting false cuts or missing true cuts. False cuts may result from certain camera operations, object movements, or flashes within a video clip; while missed ones may result from gradual shot changes.
Video parameters to be considered by such algorithms may include intensity, red-green-blue (RGB), hue-valuechroma (HVC), or motion vectors. A basic approach [13] to detect cuts is to compare the values of one or more of these parameters, such as luminance of the corresponding pixels in a pair of consecutive frames. In simple words, if the number of pixels whose luminance values have changed from one frame to the next exceeds a certain threshold, a cut is detected. Although, the solution is quite simple, but it does not usually result in high detection rates. SmartFrame, was invented in [14] to achieve a higher video cut detection rate, satisfy real-time requirements, and use low resources. SmartFrame (SF) is currently being applied in the AccesTV™ application, a product of a Canadian company, named Televitesse (merged with March Networks Corp.). Figure 2 shows the block diagram of SmartFrame.
As seen in Figure 2 , SF carries out four comparisons:
1. Short-period difference, say between frame 4 and 5, against a low threshold 2. Long-period difference, say between frame 1 and 8, against a high threshold 3. The short-period difference against the previous short-period difference, and 4. The long-period difference against the previous long-period difference.
The decision map, shown in Table 1 , takes into consideration the above four results as well as the number of frames from the previous cut or camera break, before making a decision. The symbol T in the table denotes True, which means that the comparison resulted in different values or exceeds a preset threshold. While F, denotes False, and X denotes a Don't Care state.
The first two comparisons allow SmartFrame to avoid detecting false cuts that may result from camera operations, objects movements or flashes. The second two comparisons allow gradual cuts to be detected and distinguished from sharp cuts. 
Depending on SmartFrame or similar algorithms to filter a video sequence into shot key-frames, the proposed method takes the process further and processes these keyframes into a small size digital signature to represent the video sequence in question.
IV. THE PROPOSED METHOD
The proposed method is composed of two parts, as shown in Figure 3 . The Digital Signature Generator part of the system is to process the video sequence in question. Any video can be viewed as a list of shots represented by key-frames. This mapping of video to key-frames reduces the number of frames that needs to be analyzed by a factor of 100 to 5000, depending on the video content [15] . Thus, the first step is to select key-frames out of the whole sequence. This would also allow the system cope with frame rate change in the input video. These time-stamped keyframes will be categorized under one of the following types 1. Cut: Is a frame that is marked so by the cut detection algorithm used, such as SmartFrame; see column five in Table 1 . 2. Timeout: Is a frame which occurs after a predetermined period of time in the sequence when no "cut" has been detected 3. Initial: Is the first frame in the video in question. For each key-frame selected, the color table is initialized. Among the color parameters, Luminance of values quantized to the range from 0 to 255 are selected to represent each pixel. Considering only Luminance values will make the proposed method robust against color variations. A Luminance histogram will then be generated in terms of pixel percentages. This will allow the method as well to be robust against resizing of an arbitrary factor. Finally, the length of the video sequence is also recorded.
In summary, the digital signature of a video sequence will be composed of a sequence of one-dimensional Histograms of a limited number of frames in the video sequence. These frames have a particular significance, namely "Cut", "Timeout", or "Initial", along with their relative timestamps. Such information is small in size, yet condensed in information. Figure 4 is another block diagram illustration to the Digital Signature Generator. It is put here for the sake of comparing it with that in [9] as it represents almost half of their steps. The histogram of the first frame in the sequence is created. However, if this frame represents a complete black frame which usually exists between commercials, or just before a commercial break in some TV channels, the system then waits for this break to end before capturing the first frame in the sequence. Both gradual and sharp cuts are considered simply as Cuts. The system then waits for the subsequent frame corresponding to a cut to store its histogram as the next in line, unless a certain time, say four seconds, has elapsed without a cut occurring, in that case the histogram of the next frame is taken and tagged as a "Timeout". This is to ensure that histograms are stored even when the sequence does not include cuts. The second part of the system is the Matching part. Figure 5 depicts the flow chart of the Matching process of the system. It is important to note that when comparing two histograms using the Euclidean distance of supposedly to be same frames, one from the live stream and another from the video sequence in question, it may result in some difference. The Euclidean distance between two histograms x and y is computed as follows:
Where x(L) and y(L) represent the percentages of pixels in the frame that has the Luminance value equals to L. Thus, the D values are then compared against pre set threshold values. Exact matches between histograms are not the target. This is because of the following reasons:
1. A matching pair of histograms may belong to two frames that may not have the same exact time offset due to a small shift in the sequence initial frame. 2. The broadcasting noise or the lossy codec's may have been introduced to the broadcast video stream. In the proposed method, two values of thresholds are selected: low, T L , and high, T H . The high threshold refers to a more tolerant match. It is used in comparing an Initial frame, while lower value thresholds are used in comparing between histograms of Cut frames. This is because the frames that belong to a cut is expected to be closer to an exact match in both the Signature and live stream.
The Timeout frames behave sometimes like Cuts and sometimes like Initial frames. If a Timeout frame is preceded directly or indirectly by a Cut, then it should be dealt with as a Cut. This is because the Cut synchronizes the sequence in question with the candidate sequence. While if the video sequence contains no Cut prior to a Timeout frame, then the Timeout frame should be dealt with as an Initial frame, and the higher value threshold will be used. This is because, in our system, a negative test is more critical to making quick mismatching decisions than a positive test. Positive tests will be followed by more tests before making a decision. Moreover, when comparing histograms of mismatching types, the lower value threshold (less tolerant) is used. This is because these two histograms of mismatching types should not be compared at the first place. In other words, T H is used only when an Initial frame is involved, or when comparing unsynchronized Timeout frames. The latter example may occur in a commercial that is either free from cuts or its first shot is relatively long. Other than that T L is used. Figure 6 illustrates the subroutine implemented whenever the threshold value is needed for comparison. The variable Sync refers to whether a Cut frame has preceded the time this subroutine is run or not in either the signature or the input video. , where H represents the histogram of the Signature in question, a new pointer will be assigned to the better match, and the pointers index, C, will be incremented. The left-hand side of the flow chart will attempt to move this pointer forward till all the remaining Signature histograms get their chances to be compared with a live key-frame. This pointer will be considered active till it gets destroyed or reaches its destination, the instant when a video sequence match is declared. The matching weight associated with this new pointer, with an initial value of 100, will be reduced upon assigning, by a value equals to f(k), where k refers to the case of the match. The right-hand side of the flow chart is called Assigning Pointers, while the left-hand side is called Moving Pointers.
As f(k) will be revisited later in this section, let's explain further the job of the pointers in the proposed method. Figure 7 would help us to do so. If the bottom of figure represents the input video stream, then the live position on the right would represent a run instant of the matching process. With a number of pointers equals to 6 (C=5) that have been created, the Moving Pointers part of the flow chart in Figure 5 would then run on all active pointers from 0 to 5. If Ptr[i] represents an active pointer, the system will then attempt to match the current live key-frame with the corresponding key-frame signature associated with Ptr[i].
To understand this better, remember that all pointers get first assigned to position 0, 1, or FirstCut of the signature. In Figure 7 , a represents a match, and an represents a mismatch. However, a match does not indicate a zero Time-Offset difference. As shown in the figure, two new pointers got assigned during two consecutive key-frames in the live stream. Ptr [4] Note also that Ptr [3] has suffered from a skip in comparing one of its signature histograms, which is represented by the letter S in the figure.
Each pointer may go through a matching weight reduction due to a Time_Offset difference or Type difference between the candidate and the signature histograms being matched, or due to a skip in comparing any of its histograms. Upon a match, the pointer moves forward. Upon a mismatch, the pointer is stalled or destroyed when the matching weight becomes below a certain threshold, T w . When a pointer gets destroyed it is considered as inactive. Thus, as illustrated in the Moving part of the matching process flow chart, Figure 5 , the histogram at the live position is to be compared against all active pointers. This will help in advancing each pointer by an amount of time approximately equals to the elapsed time since the last advancement. This advancement attempt may move the new position of the pointer to one of the following cases: lying between two signature histograms (called in the flow chart as x and y), lying before the next histogram (x is blank), lying beyond the last histogram (y is blank), or no more histograms in the signature to compare with (x & y are blank). In the first three cases ("Located?" of the flow chart is True), the live histogram on hand is compared against both x and y histograms. Let A represents either the histogram x or y, whichever belongs to the same type as the live one. If none, then the closer one in time; and let B represents the other one, if not blank. The pointer will then move to the position of A if a match with A has occurred, otherwise, to B if a match with B has occurred. By this, a priority is given to the same type histogram then to the closer one in time. If none matched, the pointer stays foot. In either case, the matching weight will be reduced by f(k). The weight is kept monitored and the pointer gets destroyed if its weight drops below T w .
In the fourth case ("Located?" is False), when no more histograms in the signature file to compare with exists, the active pointer in question is said to reach its destination, and a full sequence match should be declared.
The matching weight reduction is based on three critical factors listed in order as follows: the number of histograms that have been skipped in the signature file, the difference in the types of matching histograms, and the difference in the Time-Offset. Thus f(k) is as follows:
Where S is the number of frames being skipped, and t is the Time-Offset difference in seconds, while a, b, and c and constants. In other words, the matching Weight is reduces by g(S) when key-frames are being skipped. This function could further be decomposed into the following, based on the type of frames being skipped:
where S is the number of key-frames skipped and c, t, and i are their types: Cut, Timeout, and Initial, respectively. However, in the implementation of the proposed method, the shorter version is used.
VI. ROBUSTNESS AGAINST FRAME DROPPING
The proposed method is claimed to be robust against any change in either frame size or sampling rate. This is because the histograms are represented by Luminance distribution in percentages and that the system depends on key-frames selection rather than fixed resampling rate.
To verify this claim, consider the following scenario, depicted in Figure 8 , where the original video sequence is received as distorted by few frames being cut or dropped in three different locations: A, B, and C. The video sequence referred to by Figure 8 represents a 15 second commercial at a resolution of 320x240. It includes five different shots (two being caused by gradual cuts: the third and the last as their key-frames are taken a little after the end of the cuts). The video is captured digitally at an average frame rate of 15 fps. The signature is composed of five Cut key-frames and one Timeout. These are illustrated by the upper arrows in the figure. In each of the following experiments performed, only one drop of various frame lengths is considered. As illustrated in the figure, the first location A is within a normal shot, while the second, B, is within a long shot. Finally, location C is right on a supposed to be a Cut key-frame.
The following parameters were set for the experiments: The constants a, b, and c reflect how much the user is tolerant towards skipping key-frames, type mismatch, and Timeoffset differences, respectively. If for instant the video input is known to suffer a lot of frame dropping due to congestions in their paths, then one may reduce the fine for such a violation by lowering the value of a. If, on the other hand, the network does not guarantee QoS, then c should be reduced, and so on. For T L and T H , they are values that were selected after running a small experiment. We input a video stream and compared fixed three randomly selected different histograms with this video Luminance histograms sampled at 7 fps. We plotted the value of D for all three histograms. Figure 9 shows one of them. Then we selected the thresholds that causes 10% of the frames to score a match with the histogram in question, or 90% mismatch. T L was then set to the average of the three found values. T H , on the other hand, was set for the case of 20% matching probability, or 80% mismatching. They were found to be 4.1, and 4.4, respectively, as shown in Figure 10 . However, the values of T H and T L mainly affect the number of pointers that would be initialized and they are not the only factors to declare a successful sequence match. Finally, for the Weight threshold, we will set it now to 85%. More discussion on this value will follow in Section 7. Figure 11 plots the matching Weights in all the experiments versus the number of frames being dropped. Figure 12 reflects the value of the Distance between the two histograms being compared around the frame dropping point versus the number of frames being dropped. At the first location, for relatively low number of consecutive frames being dropped, no key-frames will be lost within the candidate video input nor new key-frames will be generated. Thus, dropping frames would be insignificant to the system. This is reflected by the tiny reduction in the matching Weight shown in Figure 11 which is due to Time-Offset differences that have occurred as a result to dropping the frames. However, if the number of frames being dropped becomes large, example 20, and the shot represents a hyper shot, i.e. includes fast moving objects or fast camera movements, then such dropping frames may cause a cut-like action, resulting in a new key-frame selection; consequently, a new comparison will take place. Since this key-frame in the experiment did not score a match with the successive Cut key-frame of the signature (as seen by the last point of D(A) in Figure 12 , D(A) > T), then this key-frame would be skipped, and as a result the Weight will be reduced by (a=) 10 points.
The number of frames dropped at location B carries almost the same effect. In long shots, key-frames are composed of the first significant frame of the shot as well as Timeout frames when a long duration has elapsed Threshold value without any cut being detected. Thus, dropping frames within such shots may shift the selection of Timeout frames with a duration corresponds to the number of frames being dropped. Thus, in the matching process, the comparison around that distorted point will be between slightly two different Timeout frames in terms of content. This will lead to higher Distance values when comparing their histograms, as illustrated by D(B) in Figure 12 . The matching Weight reduction as discussed earlier is due to the Time-Offset Difference, as both frames belong to the same type, but unlike in the case of location A, the weight drop caused by a Skip in this example started earlier at 8 frames being dropped. This is because the chosen T L (= 4.1) started causing a mismatch at 8, as seen in Figure 12 for location B.
Finally, dropping frames at location C follows the same discussion. The cut will be slightly shifted and the comparison around that distorted point will be between two slightly different Cut frames in terms of content.
In summary, the matching weight changes due to a reasonable number of consecutive frames being dropped in the input video are insignificant. Thus, this experiment shows the robustness of the proposed system against frame dropping, whether being key-frames or not. x-axis represents the number of frames dropped, y-axis the matching weight Figure 12 .
x-axis represents the number of frames dropped, y-axis the distance value VII. TESTING Three different commercials A, B, and C were used to generate three signatures by the proposed system. They have the lengths of 30, 30, and 15 seconds, respectively. Each has a different number of shots, due to whether sharp or gradual cuts. For commercial A, for instant, its signature is composed of 17 key-frames, of which 11 represent Cuts, one represents the Initial frame, and five represent Timeouts. For commercial B, 13 key-frames were generated, and for commercial C, 9 key-frames along with their timestamps, and their types. Commercial A and C are captured at a resolution of 240 X 180, while commercial B is at 320 x 240. The average frame rate is 15 fps.
The matching process was tested on a long stored video stream at a resolution of 320 x 240 with an average of 15 fps. It included a piece of a basketball game (characterized by an action-full video type), a long piece of a movie (characterized by little action), and a news program from CNN. The total length of the video is about 150 minutes. The stream was interrupted by 29 commercials (few are repeated) spread over six commercial breaks. Three of these commercials represent commercial A, two represent commercial B, and four represent Commercial C, spread over these six breaks. There was also a very similar commercial to that of A, done for the same company, but not the one in question. Furthermore, for commercial A, two of these three commercials were distorted by cutting 3 seconds from either the beginning or the trail of the commercial (the scenarios that marketing executives look for to request a rebroadcast). Thus, our target is to locate these videos and probably record them for a replay or just save their matching weights. Since AccesTV™ application allows the user to record the input video starting from up to 3 minutes in the past (from the cash memory), then a record start action could be triggered by a matching event if the user wishes to do so.
The proposed system was tested on this video, and the Weights of all candidate pointers per signature were tracked. Figure 13 shows the weights versus the pointer index for all three signatures, A, B, and C. Note that the same parameters listed in Table 2 were used with the exception that T w is set to 0. This is because if T w is left 85, then Figure 13 will show all those weights above 85 unchanged, but almost all remaining weights are very close to 85 (remember, as soon as the weight of any pointer drops below T w , it gets destroyed, thus, its weight stops dropping). You can find few pointers weight values are a little below 0, most of them are those of commercial A, because it contains up to 17 key-frames. The more key-frames the more skipping may occur. Thus, the lower T w value is set, the lower some of these pointers weights may get. x-axis represents the pointer index number, y-axis the matching weight
There were up to 94 pointers initiated for Commercial A, 62 for B, and 123 for C. The lower T H value is set the smaller number of pointers gets created or assigned. This is because less number of pointers would then pass the assignment test. Out of theses, three did pass 85 threshold for A, two for B, and 4 for C. These indicated the commercials successful matching declarations. Note that for commercial A, only the first matching pointer passes the 90 points, while the remaining two are approximately 87 and 85. This is because of the distortion stated in the beginning of the experiment.
Another note that could be extracted from the results in Figure 13 is that for the Weight threshold, as it is clear from the figure, there is a big gap between the weights of successful and failing pointers. Thus, if T w is set equals to 70% it would be as good as the 85%. This gives some relaxing feeling when setting the value of T w .
The same experiment was repeated but after splitting the stream into four parts. The system ran on these four parts simultaneously not on a Core 2 Duo but a Celeron 2.53 GHz with 1 GB RAM PC. The CPU seldom reached saturation and stayed for long. Memory usage stayed around 82%. All the three of commercial A, two for B, and four for C were successfully detected while running a smooth video playback at a 240x180 resolution, as seen in Figure 14 . Remember, the resolution of the monitoring need not match that of the original video sequence. Simultaneous Search
VIII. CONCLUSION
The paper proposed a system to spot a specific video sequence, such as a specific commercial, within a live video stream. The system composed of two parts; one to create a digital signature out of the video sequence in question, and another to search for this sequence within a live video stream. The proposed system can offer a high percentage hit rate. The stored video signature frame size and sampling rate do not have to match the video frame size and sampling rate of the candidate sequence, which may, for example, be a broadcast signal. Furthermore, the video signature matching will tolerate varying broadcast quality and frame dropping.
Thus the system was shown robust against any changes in either frame size or sampling rate. This is because the histograms used are represented by Luminance distribution in percentages and that the system depends on key-frames selection. The use of tagged histograms, according to whether they belong to frames that are Cuts, Initial, or Timeouts, has considerably enhanced the efficiency of the matching process.
The alert signal can take any form. It can be a visual or audible alert, or it can be used to take some actions such as increment a counter or recording a clip for later playback. The system presented in this paper can load a number of signatures simultaneously, in which case the multiple incidences of the search algorithm are run on each signature in parallel. Also it may run on a multiple video stream at the same time.
